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Abstract:  
This article aims to understand the dialectic between the visible and the invisible 
in relation to the post-hegemonic status of neo-liberalism and the role of 
mediation in that process. The neo-liberal ideological project is geared towards 
making itself invisible, positioning itself as quintessentially anti-ideological. 
However, the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism and capitalism, it is argued, 
requires its constitutive outsides to struggle for visibility. Mainstream media plays 
a pivotal role in terms of invisibilising capitalist interests, but also in terms of 
providing visibility to the constitutive outsides of capitalism. Mediation also 
implicates audiences and publics, who could be approached as an increasingly 
angry and frustrated Spivakean subaltern, distrustful of democracy and of the 
media. It is argued that a new democratic imaginary is needed, deterritorialised 
from the market imaginary and mobilizing the discontented subaltern. The 
question remains, however, if it is possible to unsettle the post-hegemonic status 
of the neoliberal ideological project. 
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Neoliberalism and the Post-Hegemonic War of Position: 
The dialectic between invisibility and visibilities 
 
Bourgeois ideology […] is that form of dominative discourse which would present itself 
entirely innocent of power. (Eagleton, 1991: 154) 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article, the media and journalism are highly relevant, but in a 
somewhat tangential way. While some media-related evidence will be 
presented and the centrality of mediation acknowledged, the main question 
before us is whether the very notion of hegemony in relation to neoliberalism 
and the capitalist values inherent to it has become so totalizing that it has 
reached post-hegemonic status.  
 
This post-hegemonic status does not mean that the many available alter-
realities are not able to or do not seek visibility through direct action, through 
the media representations of these actions and through self-mediations and 
networked technologies (Cammaerts, 2012), but rather that these ‘counter-
hegemonic’ utterances of dissensus either operate from within or at the very 
least function to strengthen the hegemony of neoliberalism and capitalism, 
aiding it to reach post-hegemonic status.  
 
If we accept that the war of position is first and foremost a mediated conflict 
waged at the symbolic level, but with serious material consequences, a set of 
observations are of particular importance when we think of the post-
hegemonic status of neoliberalism and the dialectic between invisibility and 
visibility. The first of these relates to the way in which neoliberalism as an 
ideology has managed to position itself as quintessentially anti-ideological, as 
rational and as a natural state of affairs, as invisible. The second is how the 
liberal media conceals its ideological bias in favour of the dominant interests 
in society, whilst presenting itself as objective and defending citizen interests. 
The third observation relates to the alternatives to capitalism and 
neoliberalism, which aim to be visible, but are subsequently ridiculed, 
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marginalized (i.e. do not reach a broad audience) and end up serving to 
legitimate the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism. The final observation 
relates to subaltern publics – those in whose name ‘democratic’ decisions are 
legitimated and protests against these decisions staged and who are 
positioned in very contradictory ways, as ‘citizens’, as ‘the 99%’, and/or as 
‘consumers’.  
 
Before addressing the dialectic between the invisible and the visibles in 
current political discourse and the role of mediation in that regard, the 
relationship between democracy, ideology, hegemony and discourse will be 
theorized.  
 
Democracy, Ideology and Hegemony 
 
In the field of political science, democracy tends to be defined as an essentially 
contested concept (Gallie, 1956). From the perspective of discourse theory, we 
could refer to democracy as an empty – or at the very least a floating – 
signifier (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In an interview at the University of 
Sussex (UK) at the end of the 1990s, Derrida (1997: 5) defined democracy as 
an unfulfilled promise, as a horizon of hitherto unknown possibilities; hence 
his notion of democracy to come – “the endless process of improvement and 
perfectibility, is inscribed in the concept”. 
 
The failings of liberal ‘representative’ democracy to deliver on its promises 
 
When discussing the idea of democracy to come in the 1990s, Derrida was 
implicitly responding to claims made by Fukuyama (1992) and others that the 
implosion of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc represented the definitive 
victory of liberal representative democracy and the capitalist system it 
espouses over all other alternatives. However, democracy in the West has, in 
recent decades at least, not been this ever-receding horizon of the possible. 
Democracy, it could be argued, has massively failed on its promises, it has not 
perfected itself, as implied by Derrida’s democracy to come. It could even be 
agued that many of the core-promises intrinsic to democracy and to 
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democratic values, such as: 1) promoting and extending citizen participation 
and equality; 2) a system of citizen control from below geared towards 
protecting citizen interests/the collective good; and 3) the civic freedoms to 
dissent and to contest, enabling renewal (cf. Bobbio, 1987: 42-4), are either in 
decline, been repressed or have not materialized at all.  
 
The liberal representative model of democracy has in many Western countries 
been seen to protect the interests of the few first and foremost to the 
detriment of those of the many, regardless of which political party or coalition 
is in power. In this regard, Crouch (2004) argues that we live in a post-
democratic age. Liberal democracy, he claims, is merely a shell geared towards 
protecting capitalism and property, rather than citizen interests. This can also 
be linked to the crisis of liberal representative democracy, perceived to be 
caused by the widening gap between ‘ordinary’ citizens and their political 
representatives and the lack of symmetry between the decisions the latter 
make in the name of the former and the interests of the former; young people 
in particular are highly critical of this democratic deficit (Crozier, et al., 1975; 
Norris, 2011; Cammaerts, et al., 2014).  
 
A recent audit of the health of democracy in the UK asserted in quite dramatic 
terms that “representative democracy is in long-term, terminal decline” 
(Wilks-Heek, et al., 2012: 16-17). The authors concluded furthermore that, 
“the power which large corporations and wealthy individuals now wield on the 
UK political system is unprecedented” (Ibid). In relation to the US similar 
conclusions have been drawn – Bartels (2008: 284), for example, questions 
whether “democracy can flourish in the midst of great concentrated wealth”, 
precisely because this “has pervasive and corrosive effects on political 
representation and policy making”. Marxists would of course comment that 
this is not a new phenomenon, but it is certainly a debate which now also 
takes place from within liberal political theory. Neo-pluralists, for example, 
“are prepared to concede what conventional pluralists always denied, that 
business interests occupy a position of special importance compared with 
other social interests” in a democracy (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 293).  
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Linked to this is the way in which democracy is defined and used as an idea 
and as a practice. Arguably democracy has been reduced and constrained to 
liberal – and above all to representative – democracy. There are, however, 
many other more participatory and radical models of democracy out there 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Held, 2006). As we defend in this special issue, 
democracy should be much more than the least worst ‘method’ to select the 
most apt leaders for a given demos, as implied by Churchill1 and by those 
advocating a competitive elitism pitted against the tyranny of the majority 
(Lippmann, 1925; Schumpeter, 1942 [1973]).  
 
Ideology and ‘the real’ 
 
Ideology was coined as a concept in the wake of the French revolution, but 
was made popular above all by Marxist theory and the ensuing critical 
tradition. Using the Marxist lingo, ideology is constituted at the level of the 
superstructure which is determined and thus juxtaposed to the ‘real’ material 
conditions as they present themselves (Marx and Engels, 1846 [1970]: 47). 
Resulting from this, it was argued, the ruling ideology aligns with the ideas 
and interests of the dominant elites of that era:  
 
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant 
material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; 
hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, 
the ideas of their dominance. (ibid, 64) 
 
In Marxism, ideology is thus reduced to bourgeois ideology, geared towards 
legitimating the unequal and exploitative relationship between the dominant 
and the subordinate classes. It achieves this by producing invisibles or, to use 
a Hegelian concept, negations. Ideology, in other words, conceals the real or 
genuine social contradictions and normalizes class domination and 
exploitation.  
 
                                            
1 in a speech to the UK House of Commons on 11 November 1947, Churchill said that democracy is “the 
worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” 
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This negative way of defining ideology as first and foremost bourgeois 
ideology, as a false consciousness-instilling device fully determined by the 
material conditions, has been critiqued from within as well as from outside of 
Marxist thinking. Neo-Marxist perspectives considerably loosened and 
nuanced the rigid determinism which states that the material conditions – the 
relations of production – define the nature of the superstructure as staunchly 
defended by orthodox Marxism. Besides this, ideology was also articulated in 
ways that went beyond class-reductionism and was inclusive of other forms of 
oppression relating to race, gender and sexuality (Gorz, 1980; Center for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
 
Neo- and Post-Marxist thinkers gave the cultural, the symbolic and thus also 
the ideational more agency, but still see ideology in terms of relations of 
domination. Althusser (1971: 109) famously referred to the Lacanian 
imaginary order to decouple ideology from the supposed ‘real’ material 
conditions – “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence”. The ideational and ideology itself came to 
be seen as having materiality too and thus able to shape the material 
conditions. As Bennett (1982: 51) contended: 
 
the signifying systems which constitute the sphere of ideology are themselves 
viewed as the vehicles through which the consciousness of social agents is 
produced. 
 
This brings us neatly onto the Gramscian concept of hegemony as an 
important vehicle through which political consciousness is shaped.  
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From Hegemony to Post-Hegemony 
 
By introducing hegemony, Gramsci aimed to explain the conundrum most 
Marxists have struggled with at some point or another, namely why do most 
people willingly accept their subordinate position and consent to their 
blatantly obvious exploitation? Gramsci (1971) quite rightly felt that this could 
not be explained merely by economic determinism, nor by simplistic theories 
of false consciousness (i.e. ‘the stupidity’ of the working classes) or by the 
repressive tactics and brutal force of the bourgeois state. This brought him to 
the Greek concept of the hegemon, understood as: rule by consent through the 
exertion of moral and intellectual leadership.  
 
Gramsci pointed out that rule by consent was most effective if and when the 
domination of the dominant interests in society could be presented as mere 
common sense – as “the folklore of philosophy, […] always half-way between 
folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and economics of the 
specialists” (ibid: 326). Gramsci (ibid, 330) contended that it is particularly 
when hegemony is “connected to and implicit in practical life” of ordinary 
people, that it is most powerful and pervasive. Common sense, furthermore, is 
articulated as objective truth, as rational, and thus as quintessentially anti-
ideological; “in common sense it is the realistic, materialistic elements that 
predominate” (ibid: 420 – emphasis in original). This resonates with 
Bourdieu’s (1977: 164) conception of Doxa – a situation in which “the natural 
and social world appears as self-evident” and inescapable or habitual to stay 
with Bourdieusian language. 
 
Besides this, Gramsci (1971: 59) provided us with another conceptual tool to 
understand the persisting hegemonic dominance of capitalism and of 
dominant elites’ interests, namely that of the passive revolution – “a 
revolution without revolution”. In the face of fundamental counter-hegemonic 
challenges, such as financial crises (cf. 1930s), the bourgeoisie and capitalism 
will mutate and reconfigure with a view of safeguarding and subsequently 
reasserting capitalist interests. We could argue that this is also captured by 
Schumpeter’s (1942 [1973]) notion of “creative destruction”. Passive 
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revolutions produce genuine change and can be the impetus for far reaching 
transformations, but crucially whilst at the same time protecting the 
fundamental interests and the ultimate hegemony of the property and capital-
owning classes. In other words, hegemony is sustained by taking into account 
and balancing out – to some extent at least – “the interests and the tendencies 
of the groups over which hegemony will be exercised” (Gramsci, 1971: 161), 
with a view to reassert “the control that was slipping from its grasp” (ibid: 
210). 
 
Gramsci was acutely aware that in Western Europe, where the state and civil 
society was much more complex and strongly embedded in the fabric of 
society, it would be near impossible to adopt the same rather blunt ‘frontal 
attack’ strategy as the Bolsheviks did in Russia – “a strategy and tactics 
altogether more complex and long-term” is required, he lamented (Gramsci, 
1971: LXVI). By using the metaphor of war, Gramsci called for a trench-war, a 
war of position, rather than one of manoeuvre. This war of position was to be 
a war in opposition to common sense and mainly situated at the level of the 
cultural and ideational whereby the educational system, the media and civil 
society should be used to construct and further a counter-hegemony to 
capitalism and to the liberal democratic system which sustains and legitimates 
it2. 
 
Gramsci also acknowledged the crucial importance of language in this regard, 
which he defined as “a totality of determined notions and concepts and not 
just of words and grammatically devoid of content” (1971: 323). This concurs 
with our understanding of what discourse is and does. It is not par accident 
that Gramsci and the interplay between hegemony and counter-hegemonies 
plays such a pivotal role in discourse theory to articulate a radical politics 
embedded within a democratic framework rather than entirely outside of it 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
 
Discourse theory, in line with Gramsci, stresses that hegemony is never total. 
Common sense, Gramsci (1971: 326) stated, “is continually transforming 
                                            
2 Gramsci himself never used the term counter-hegemony, but he certainly implied it. 
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itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions 
which have entered ordinary life”. As a result of this, it is argued, hegemony is 
not a stable state. In addition to this, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 135-6), 
following Derrida, argue that hegemony is constituted through and feeds off 
its antagonisms:  
 
in order to speak of hegemony […] it is also necessary that the articulation 
should take place through a confrontation with antagonistic articulatory 
practices – in other words, that hegemony should emerge in a field criss-
crossed by antagonisms and therefore suppose phenomena of equivalence and 
frontier effects.  
 
Thus, if we were to accept that neo-liberalism has no real antagonistic 
ideological enemy anymore, that it has become truly ‘post-hegemonic’, that 
there is no valid constitutive outside or frontier any longer, this would at the 
same time imply the death of politics and of the political. Hence, the question 
which poses itself today, is whether there still is a genuine unterscheidung3 
when it comes to neoliberalism, capitalist interests and its alternatives in 
current democratic regimes?; and if not, what are the consequences of this? A 
related question has to do with the precise role of the media and of 
communication in all this; the war of position is a mediated war first and 
foremost, but as pointed out above one with clear material consequences.  
 
The mediated post-hegemonic war of position  
 
While mediation has arguably always been pivotal in terms of waging a war of 
position, media and communication does not feature much in the work of 
Marx and most of the Marxist theorists discussed above. Peters (2001: 125 – 
emphasis in original) for instance, stated that Marx himself “nowhere 
discusses communication in a sustained way” – and if media and/or 
communication does appear, it is in a rather rudimentary fashion as part of a 
list of actors and/or factors – for example as one of the Ideological State 
Apparatuses (Althusser, 1971). These accounts, as Thompson (1990: 95) also 
                                            
3 This refers to the work of Carl Schmidt (1996 [1927]) and the distinction between (ideological) enemies 
and friends 
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asserts, do not do justice “to the centrality of mass communication in modern 
and political life”. In this article I aim to elucidate the dialectic between the 
visible and the invisible in relation to the post-hegemonic status of neo-
liberalism and the role of mediation in that process. 
 
First, the way in which neoliberalism positions itself as quintessentially anti-
ideological is explained. Second, the role of liberal mainstream media in 
perpetuating the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism is discussed. Third, 
the way in which alternatives to neoliberalism serve to strengthen the post-
hegemonic status of neoliberalism is outlined to end with some thoughts 
regarding subaltern publics which are inherently part of the mediation 
process. 
 
Neoliberalism as quintessentially anti-ideological? 
 
Neoliberalism is understood here as a worldview that not only advocates a 
minimal state, but above all promotes the primacy of the free market, 
capitalism, property rights, and individualism in all walks of life. 
Neoliberalism can be seen as an ideological project that not only aims to 
reduce the power of the state to intervene in or regulate economic and social 
life, but also champions values such as greed and individual self-interest 
(Friedman, 1962; Rand, 1964). As Hallin (2008: 52) pointedly observes, 
neoliberalism can also be seen as “a very deliberate effort on the part of the 
economic elites to turn back the challenges to their power represented by the 
new social movements” of the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Undoubtedly, what neoliberal as an ideology has managed to achieve in the 
last couple of decades is quite remarkable and above all cunning. First of all, 
ideology was emptied of its radical, critical meaning (see discussion above) 
and now refers to a set of beliefs, any kind of beliefs. Secondly, neoliberalism 
has outfoxed Marxist theory by adopting a very similar, but reversed, 
perspective on ideology. Marxist perspectives define ideology as ‘the Other’ – 
i.e. bourgeois interests of capital and property – and its own solutions and 
conceptions of the common good are positioned as non-ideological, as relating 
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to the ‘real’ material conditions. Neoliberalism in its current incarnation, I 
would argue, does exactly the same. The neoliberal project positions itself as a 
post-narrative – as facticity, as non-negotiable and thus as quintessentially 
anti-ideological (Lash, 2007), while positioning their constitutive Others as 
deeply ideological, as biased, as mad or nostalgic – of a by gone era. 
 
Referring to Hegel, it could be argued that neoliberalism has managed to 
negate the negation of the negation. Drawing upon Hegel, Žižek (2008: 189) 
defines the negation of the negation as “a victory in defeat: it occurs when 
one’s specific message is accepted as a universal framework, even by the 
enemy”, turning a contingency into a necessity. If we accept that the first 
negation refers to the negation of workers’ rights and their means of 
production by bourgeois society, the second – communist – negation then 
refers to the expropriation of the expropriators (Marx, 1909: 837). 
Neoliberalism represents the third negation, negating the second negation. 
 
A good example of this is the way in which so-called Third Way politics4 and 
the rejection of ideological fault lines between left and right, the warm 
embracement of capitalism and the market by the reformist left was conducive 
to affirming neoliberalism as post-hegemonic. To further emphasize this 
point, Peter Mandelson (2008), one of the architects of the UK New Labour, 
famously declared that they were “intensely relaxed about people getting filthy 
rich”.  
 
One of the detrimental results of this ideological alignment is that today 
leftwing approaches and solutions are positioned as conservative and 
reactionary, whereas rightwing solutions taking away rights and privileging 
the few are presented as the new progressive, as the way forward. All this 
points to what Mouffe (2013) has called the post-political situation we find 
ourselves in. The question this raises, however, is whether this post-political 
                                            
4 Third Way politics represents to alignment of socialism and/or social democratic politics with liberal 
and capitalist values (see: Giddens, 1994). It was put into practice by the likes of Bill Clinton (US), Tony 
Blair (UK) and Gerhard Schröder (D). In the UK this led to the emergence of New Labour, rejecting its 
socialist past.  
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condition is also post-hegemonic, a totality that has today become impossible 
to unsettle or deterritorialize? 
 
Mainstream media in the service of post-hegemonic neoliberalism?  
 
Arguably, one of the most important ways in which this post-hegemonic status 
of neoliberalism has been achieved is through news and media content 
production. Overall, it would be fair to say that in Western democracies, 
despite the advent of the internet and the emergence of notions such as citizen 
journalism and user generated content, the production of media content and 
especially its distribution are predominantly in the hands of a very limited 
number of private actors (Hesmondhalgh, 2002; McChesney, 2004). In the 
UK context, the dominant position of News Corp. and the Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc. in the newspaper industry (together they boast almost a 
60% share of the newspaper market5) is illustrative of this. Furthermore, 
News Corp. also owns 40% of BSkyB6, which in turn has a market share of 
70% in the UK pay-TV market. In other Western democracies similar patterns 
of concentration in the media and communication industries can be observed. 
 
This high degree of horizontal – within one industry – as well as vertical – 
across industries – concentration in terms of media production and 
distribution of media content did not occur inadvertently (Freedman, 2008). 
As political economists will point out (Foster, 1986; Dal Bó, 2006), this is the 
result of well-known tendencies within capitalism such as the tendency to 
gravitate towards monopolies or oligopolies and the capture of regulatory 
agencies by the interests of powerful actors in the industry which they need to 
regulate. Given the fact that media and communication have always been 
highly regulated sectors, the concentration of media ownership is something 
that has been encouraged by political elites who often align themselves with 
the interests of the owners of these media conglomerates. Media owners have 
also consistently yielded their resource power with a view to resist, avoid or 
                                            
5 See Audit Bureau of Circulation: http://www.abc.org.uk/  
6 See: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/media-policy-planner/idiots-guides/media-plurality-newscorps-bid-for-
bskyb/  
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reduce regulation, especially when it comes to cross-ownership, but also 
advertising (Street, 2001).  
 
From a critical and normative perspective, the existence or rather 
perseverance of such “monopolies of knowledge”, as Innis (1951) described 
this particular type of capitalist concentration, are seen to be detrimental to 
democratic values and to the overall health of a democracy. McChesney 
(2004: 7) makes this same point when he argues that:  
 
The corporate domination of both the media system and the policy-making 
process that establishes and sustains it causes serious problems for a 
functioning democracy and a healthy culture. Media are not the only factor in 
explaining the woeful state of our democracy, but they are a key factor. 
 
In addition to this, as already alluded to earlier, the media is the prime vehicle 
through which other products and services are marketed to an audience that is 
mostly positioned as a consumer, not as a democratic public or a demos 
(Thompson, 1990: 178).  
 
All this inevitably has an impact on the media and news content that is 
produced by these media and communication conglomerates. For example, 
contrary to the traditional watchdog role ascribed to journalism by the liberal 
normative model, “[p]owerful global forces, most notably the global financial 
markets and transnational business corporations,” are rarely scrutinized nor 
held to account by the liberal mainstream media (Curran, 2005: 138). Recent 
research into the way journalists and the media organisations they represent, 
reported on economic and financial matters, both pre- as well as post-2008 
financial crisis is illustrative of this (Berry, 2012; Manning, 2012). The 
specialized “financial media did not act as our antennae and they did not warn 
us”, Manning (2012: 187) concludes; even worse, in the aftermath of the 2008 
crash, they consciously choose “not to vigorously investigate and report the 
information that was emerging from within the financial systems around the 
world” so as not to jeopardize the capitalist system they serve. As will be 
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outlined below, bias can also be observed when it comes to the representation 
of systemic contestation to and alternatives of capitalism.  
 
Given all this, it is not surprising that many, both from within and from 
outside the liberal paradigm, argue that rich and affluent elites in conjunction 
with the ‘corporate community’ have a disproportionate influence on 
democracy and on the media sphere (Mann, 1986; Crouch, 2004; McChesney, 
2004; Domhoff, 2013).  
 
The alternatives as constitutive of neoliberal post-hegemony? 
 
It is often said that ‘there is no alternative’ to capitalism and neoliberal 
values7. However, there are of course plenty of alternatives to capitalist modes 
of production and exchange: different choices can be made in terms of 
distributing land, property and wealth nationally and internationally; or 
different models and modes of exchange could be promoted; regulation could 
be much more stringent and more public interest oriented, etc. In other 
words, yes, there are plenty of alternatives, but none of them are deemed to be 
realistic within the parameters of the values inherent to neoliberalism – which 
I will call here ‘the inside’. However, at the same time, it could also be argued 
that the post-hegemonic status of neoliberalism requires ‘constitutive 
outsides’, i.e. its alternatives, to be somewhat visible with a view to labeling 
them as ideological; and thus unreasonable, irrational and radical.  
 
While from a normative perspective, the democratic role of the media is to be 
“responsive to the demands of civil society” (Curran, 2005: 138), it is often 
argued that media organisations and journalists are negatively biased against 
those that dissent in a democracy, especially when it concerns systemic 
contestations of capitalist interests. This is apparent in the way in which 
industrial conflicts and trade unions or anti-capitalist protesters have been 
portrayed in the UK media, for example (Glasgow Media Group, 1976/1980; 
Donson, et al., 2004; McCurdy, 2012). Dissent and contestations that 
challenge capitalist interests, private ownership and the dominant political 
                                            
7 as famously decried by the late Margaret Thatcher 
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structures which protect these interests, are granted visibility, but usually in a 
negative way by adopting a derisory inferential tone or by inducing moral 
panics.  
 
It would, however, be wrong to treat ‘the media’ and journalists that work 
within media organisations in an essentialist manner and to consider them all 
to be docile servants of capitalist interests and the power elite, as some of the 
Marxist as well as neo-pluralist accounts of mainstream media seem to 
suggest. Arguably a more nuanced and complex perspective is needed in order 
to make sense of the intricacies of the relationship between ideology, 
capitalism, and mainstream media in a liberal democracy.  
 
We could refer here to Bourdieu (1998) who spoke of a degree of field 
autonomy for journalism, which is by no means absolute – i.e. the journalism 
field is impacted by other arguably more powerful fields, but neither is some 
degree of autonomy totally absent. For sure, dominant neoliberal ideology is 
eagerly reproduced and disseminated through and by liberal mainstream 
media (Phelan, 2007), but – in line with a Foucauldian approach – resistance 
to this prevalent tendency can be observed at times as well, even from within 
the mainstream. Journalists have to navigate and negotiate many different 
roles and reach an increasingly fragmented number of constituencies. They 
are expected to be independent and critical, but at the same time they are 
political beings and employees of media organisations with distinct editorial 
lines (Carpentier, 2005). Furthermore, oppositional culture is not entirely 
stifled in mainstream media. 
 
In the UK, broadcasters such as the BBC and Channel 4 or newspapers, such 
as The Guardian and The Independent, all at times provide a platform to 
dissenting voices that are highly critical of capitalism and neoliberalism. A 
recent example in this regard was the British comedian Russell Brands’ 
scathing and controversial attack on representative democracy and on 
capitalism when he appeared on BBC’s Newsnight prior to his guest-
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editorship of The New Statesman8. The occasional opinion piece by Žižek 
published in left-leaning liberal mainstream newspapers can also be seen in 
this light.  
 
However, many of these critiques from within the liberal media are also 
somewhat contradictory. Take for example the TV-programs of the British 
political satirist Charlie Brooker (f.e. Newswipe). On the one hand, his shows 
are highly critical of the liberal media and the right wing values it propagates, 
but on the other hand they were for quite a long time produced by Endemol, 
the Dutch production company of Big Brother, which in turn is owned by 
Berlusconi’s Mediaset. Comedy Central, which produces The Daily Show and 
The Colbert Report, is owned by Viacom, the world’s 4th largest media 
conglomerate active in film and TV production, advertising, distribution and 
publishing. As the late alternative comedian Bill Hicks once declaimed in a 
rant against ‘marketing people’ and advertising more generally: 
 
I know what all the marketing people are thinking right now: ‘Oh, you know 
what Bill is doing right now? He is going for that anti-marketing dollar, that is 
a good market, he’s very smart’9 
 
Systemic critiques of capitalism are not completely absent in the mainstream 
media, but even on a ‘public service’ broadcaster such as the BBC, “[anti-
systemic] accounts tend to appear relatively rarely and/or at the margins of 
coverage” (Berry, 2012: 268). At the same time, I argue that the enduring 
presence of (some) anti-systemic voices in the mainstream media is above all 
instrumental to the preservation of the post-hegemonic status of 
neoliberalism as quintessentially anti-ideological.  
 
I concur here with Miliband Sr. (1969: 64) who argued that “a monopoly of 
the means of communication, or the prohibition of expression of all 
alternative views and opinions” is not necessary to control “the economic and 
political systems of advanced capitalism”. Indeed, as Miliband pointed out 
several decades ago, the control of economic and politics systems by capitalist 
                                            
8 See URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YR4CseY9pk  
9 Revelations Show, Dominion Theater, London, December 1992. 
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interests “may well be better served without such a monopoly”, especially as 
liberty and freedom are the core-values of liberalism. The lack of such a 
monopoly is thus essential in order to preserve the discursive integrity of 
neoliberalism and is not really an issue as long as the majority of media 
organisations exert symbolic and ideological control in favour of the interests 
of the few. As such, Miliband’s words still ring true when he asserted that 
 
the press may well claim to be independent and to fulfill an important 
watchdog function. What the claim overlooks, however, is the very large fact 
that it is the Left at which the watchdogs generally bark with most ferocity, 
and what they are above all protecting is the status quo. (ibid: 199  – emphasis 
in original) 
 
Of course, activists and social movements that challenge neoliberalism and 
capitalist modes of production and exchange are not only dependent on 
mainstream media resonance to gain visibility, they have always used other 
media and communication technologies that are at their disposal to 
communicate movement frames independently; and this is certainly the case 
in today’s information society.  
 
Pamphlets, satirical prints, letters, flyers, stickers, buttons, posters, radio, 
cassettes, video, TV and more recently the internet have all at some point been 
appropriated into the self-mediation toolbox of activists and social 
movements (cf. Fanon, 1965; Darnton, 1982; Sreberny-Mohammadi and 
Mohammadi, 1994; Downing, et al. 2001; Cammaerts, et al., 2013). Such 
communicative technologies in the hands of activists serve to disseminate 
movement frames, but also to construct a positive self-image of the 
movement, celebrating and thereby self-affirming collective identities and 
gain respect and support ‘from below’ (Fraser, 2000: 221) 
  
The main issue in relation to the use of (alternative) movement media 
remains, however, that they tend to reach micro- rather than mass-audiences 
and in addition to this, those that are reached through movement media are 
more likely to be those that are already aligned with the movement’s frames, 
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impeding resonance beyond the likeminded (Rucht, 2013). This also brings us 
to the question of audiences, to the publics in whose name politicians rule and 
protesters advocate.  
 
The subaltern publics who dare not speak? 
 
If we accept the premise that the post-hegemonic war of position is mainly a 
mediated war shaped by the dialectic between struggles of invisibility and 
visibility, it is not enough to only consider the production of symbolic 
meaning by political and media elites or by activists; we need to include the 
audience or rather publics as well, i.e. those whom producers of meaning aim 
to reach and above all influence. Mediation, as Silverstone (2006: 42) quite 
rightly pointed out, is as much about the producers of content as it is about 
those who receive that content. It also relates to what those who receive do 
with that content and crucially what that content does to those who receive it. 
In politics and in media studies alike, what we commonly know as the 
audience has been articulated in a wide variety of ways and varying degrees of 
agency has been attributed to what we understand the audience to be – from 
passive and uncritical consumers to active resisting publics.  
 
Regarding the former, we could refer to the original cover of Guy Debord’s 
Society of the Spectacle book (1967). The image was comprised of an audience 
wearing spectacles, all staring at what we can assume is an early 3D-
projection. The image exhumes an uncomfortable uniformity; without 
exception all the subjects in the picture are utterly transfixed by the spectacle, 
nobody resists, no one dissents – they are willing victims of ‘the permanent 
opium war’ (Debord, 1967: #44). This is reminiscent of the way in which 
members of the Frankfurter Schule, but also Herman and Chomsky (1988), 
approach the audience; as the subordinate masses, bereft of agency and 
uncritically swallowing the imperialist and capitalist propaganda that is being 
fed to them on a daily basis. Also in some liberal accounts we can witness a 
rather negative inflection towards the masses tied to the classic liberal fear of 
the tyranny of the majority and of mob rule by “the bewildered herd”, to refer 
to Walter Lippmann (1925). 
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From the 1980s onward, the cultural studies tradition has quite rightly 
critiqued this culturally pessimistic account of the passive audience. From a 
culturalist perspective, the audience is attributed much more agency, it is 
varied and segmented; some accepting and others actively resisting 
mainstream representations (Hall, 1997). Proponents of a cultural studies 
approach nuanced the rigid domination model by stressing the polysemic 
nature of media production and emphasizing the importance of potential 
differences in social positions and contexts between those encoding and those 
decoding meaning, thereby also opening up a space for negotiation or 
rejection of meaning. This in combination with cognitive approaches has 
given rise to notions such as the active audience or even the user of 
technology, both implying less passive actors (Livingstone, 2013). 
 
However, as argued above, the resistant ideological readings are integral to 
and become intrinsically constitutive of the dominant preferred ideological 
reading, which aims to remain hidden, thereby confirming its post-hegemonic 
status, obscuring inherent conflict. This entrenched war of position between 
the dominant reading, which presents itself as invisible and alternative 
readings which adopt strategies of “monstration” (Dayan, 2013), becomes 
highly problematic if we bring the notion of audiences as publics into the fray.  
 
Despite their various struggles for visibility, the constitutive outsides of 
neoliberalism are not considered desirable in liberal democracies by large 
parts of its populations. This inevitably brings us back to the notion of false 
consciousness. As argued above, false consciousness comes with a lot of 
historical baggage, but Lukes (2005: 149 – emphasis in original) made an 
attempt to save it:  
 
[unwelcome historical baggage] can be removed if one understands [false 
consciousness] to refer, not to the arrogant assertion of a privileged access to 
truths presumed unavailable to others, but rather to a cognitive power of 
considerable significance and scope namely, the power to mislead. 
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Lukes acknowledges that false consciousness, understood like this, is never 
absolute or total. Indeed, many might be perfectly aware of their subordinate 
position and frustrated about their macro- and micro-exploitation but without 
therefore wanting or feeling it necessary to do anything about it. As Lukes 
(2005: 150 – emphasis in original) contends, echoing Foucault to some 
extent, “one can consent to power and resent the mode of its exercise”. This 
last point could be related to the very high levels of anger and frustration 
towards democratic politics and the media by large parts of the population in 
Western democracies. In 2013, two thirds of EU citizens did not to trust their 
national parliament (68%) or government (71%)10. When it comes to media 
similar degrees of distrust can be found; on average 60% of European citizens 
do not trust their press11. 
 
Approaching the audience as a Spivakean (rather than a Gramscian) subaltern 
might be fruitful in this regard. Spivak (1988) precisely reacted against those 
that pretended to know the ‘true’ interests and consciousness of the subaltern 
and claim to speak in its name. The subaltern, Spivak argued, is not 
homogenous, but rather a divided heterogeneous incoherent entity without a 
common will, but at the same time a principle of resistance, potentially 
disruptive and an always present threat to dominant elites, but it is silent too; 
it ceases to be subaltern (and arguably ceases to be audience) when it dares to 
speak (Spivak, 1988).  
 
The reality of this threat can be witnessed in the way in which some capitalist 
elites are starting to see the increased inequalities in Western democracies as 
a danger to the status quo. The focus on inequality as a global risk by the most 
recent World Economic Forum (WEF, 2014) and a recent speech by IMF 
director Christine Lagarde (2014) warning against the dangers of inequality 
and ensuing political instability attest to this.  
 
  
                                            
10 Eurobarometer 79: Public Opinion in the European Union. July 2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_first_en.pdf  
11 Eurobarometer 80: Media Use in the European Union. November 2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_media_en.pdf  
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Concluding Thoughts 
 
The post-hegemonic war of position is approached here mainly as a mediated 
discursive war, but with real material consequences. This war of position 
consists above all in guarding the invisibility of capitalist interests, more so 
than in silencing, ignoring or distorting the alternatives to it. The post-
hegemonic war of position which the neoliberal project wages is primarily 
geared towards controlling and defining the parameters of what is considered 
to be sane and rational, what common sense really looks like and crucially 
what falls outside of these parameters, its ‘constitutive outsides’.  
 
The post-hegemonic stage we find ourselves in relates to the dialectic between 
invisibility and visibilities and consists in the ability to make certain interests 
invisible while the ideological others do all in their power to be or become 
visible. In line with Lukes’ (2005: 1) three-dimensional view of power -
“[power] is at its most effective when least observable”. From this perspective, 
neoliberal ideology has been very successful at making itself invisible as an 
ideology and presenting itself to us entirely innocent of power, to refer back to 
the quote of Eagleton at the outset of this article.  
 
However, this invisibility or negation – to put it in Hegelian terms – is 
sustained through the struggles of visibility waged by the antagonistic 
constitutive outsides. While the horizon beyond ‘the inside’ is often 
represented as a dark one, as dangerous, crazy or unrealistic, the constitutive 
outsides are not ignored or fully closed-down. Liberal mainstream media do 
not silence critical voices – the discursive nodes of ‘freedom’ and ‘tolerance’ 
are after all pivotal to its core-values and the marketplace of ideas is open to 
anyone. Systemic critiques are rather neutralized through co-option or by 
giving them limited degrees of visibility, precisely with a view to delegitimize 
them as the constitutive ‘radical’ outside.  
 
It is, however, also too simplistic to assume that those who are on the 
receiving end of this post-hegemonic war of position between invisibility and 
visibility are somehow drugged by media spectacles to such an extent that 
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they cannot see their own ‘real’ material interests anymore or only consider 
self-interest rather than cultivate a sense of community and collectivity. The 
anger and frustration felt by subaltern publics, young and old, in many 
European democracies is vigorous but subdued at the same time, it is directed 
at economic, political and media elites alike, but just like the Spivakean 
subaltern it dare not speak.  
 
This discontented subaltern should be mobilized to foster collective solutions 
and communality, as argued for among others by Gilbert (2013). In the 
context of the argument developed in this article, we could refer to the need 
for more democratic control and oversight, for more genuine pluralism in 
media and public discourse, and to advocate for an unapologetic renewed 
politics of redistribution. In order to achieve this, a new ‘democracy to come’, 
a new democratic imaginary deterritorialised from the market imaginary, is 
needed, as also called for by Gramsci in the 1910s. An entirely new state 
apparatus needs to be constructed, Gramsci (1977: 133) argued, “which 
internally will function democratically, i.e. will guarantee freedom to all anti-
capitalist tendencies and offer them the possibility of forming a proletarian 
government”. 
 
The question remains, however, to which extent this is possible given the post-
hegemonic era we live in whereby the struggles for visibility of such re-
articulations have become inherently constitutive of the strategies of 
invisibilisation by neoliberalism and capitalist interests and the subaltern - 
audiences, democratic publics, the 99% - are not ready or in a position to give 
their support for any of the constitutive outsides.  
 
  
European Journal of Communication  
 23. 
References: 
 
Althusser, Louis (1971) Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays. London: New Left Books. 
Bartels, Larry M. (2008) Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bennett, Tony (1982): 'Theories of the media, theories of society', pp. 30-55 in Michael 
Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (eds) Culture, Society 
and the Media. London: Methuen. 
Berry, Mike (2012) ‘The Today programme and the banking crisis’. Journalism 14(2): 253-70. 
Bobbio, Norberto (1987) Which Socialism?. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1998) On Television and Journalism. London: Pluto Press. 
Cammaerts, Bart (2012) ‘Protest Logics and the Mediation Opportunity Structure’, European 
Journal of Communication 27(2): 117-34. 
Cammaerts, Bart, Bruter, Michael, Banaji, Shakuntala, Harrison, Sarah and Anstead, Nick 
(2014) ‘The Myth of Youth Apathy: Young Europeans’ critical attitudes towards 
democratic life’, American Behavioral Scientist 58(5): 645-64. 
Cammaerts, Bart, Matoni, Alice and McCurdy, Partick (eds) (2013) Mediation and Protest 
Movements. Bristol: Intellect. 
Carpentier, Nico (2005) Identity, contingency and rigidity: The (counter-)hegemonic 
constructions of the identity of the media professional. Journalism 6(2): 199-219. 
Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (1982) The Empire Strikes Back. London: 
Hutchinson. 
Crouch, Colin (2004) Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Crozier, Michel, Huntington, Samuel P. and Watanuki, Joji (1975) The Crisis Of Democracy. 
Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: 
New York University Press.  
Curran, James (2005) Mediations of Democracy, pp. 122-49 in James Curran and Michael 
Gurevitch (eds) Mass Media and Society – 4th Edition. London: Hodder Arnold. 
Dal Bó, Ernesto (2006) Regulatory Capture: A Review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
22(2): 203-25. 
Darnton, Robert (1982) The Literary Underground of the Old Regime. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Dayan, Daniel (2013) ‘Conquering Visibility, Conferring Visibility: Visibility Seekers and 
Media Performance’. International Journal of Communication 7: 137-53. 
Debord, Guy (1967) La Societé du Spectacle. Paris: Buchet/Chastel, translated as 'The 
Spectacle Society', see: http://www.nothingness.org/SI/debord.html  
Derrida, Jacques (1997) Politics of Friendship. London: Verso. 
Donson, Fiona, Graeme Chesters, Ian Welsh and Andrew Tickle (2004) ‘Rebels with a cause, 
folk devils without a panic: press jingoism, policing tactics and anti-capitalist protest in 
London and Prague’, Internet Journal of Criminology. See URL: 
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Donson%20et%20al%20-
%20Folkdevils.pdf  
Downing, John D., with T. V., Ford, G. Gil and Laura Stein (2001) Radical Media: Rebellious 
Communication and Social Movements, London: Sage. 
European Journal of Communication  
 24. 
Dunleavy, Patrick and O'Leary, Brendan (1987) Theories of the State: the politics of liberal 
democracy. Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Eagleton, Terry (1991) Ideology: An Introduction. London: Verso. 
Gallie, Walter Bryce (1956) 'Essentially Contested Concepts', Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 56: 167-98. 
Fanon, Franz (1965) A Dying Colonialism (translation by Haakon Chavalier). New York, NY: 
Grove Press. 
Foster, John Bellamy (1986) The theory of monopoly capitalism: An elaboration of Marxian 
political economy. New York, NY: Monthly review Press. 
Fraser, Nancy (2000) ‘Rethinking Recognition’. New Left Review 3(May/June): 107-20. 
Freedman, Des (2008) The Politics of Media Policy. Cambridge: Polity. 
Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Giddens, Anthony (1994) Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity. 
Gilbert, Jeremy (2013) Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of 
Individualism. London: Pluto Press. 
Glasgow Media Group (1976/1980) Bad News and More Bad News. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Gorz, André (1980) Adieux au Prolétariat: au delà du socialisme. Paris: Galilée.  
Gramsci, Antonio (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart Ltd. 
Gramsci, Antonio (1977) Selections from Political Writings (1910-1920). London: Lawrence 
and Wishart Ltd. 
Hall, Stuart (1997) Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. 
London: Sage. 
Hallin, Daniel C. (2008) ‘Neoliberalism, social movements and change in media systems in 
the late twentieth century’, pp. 43-58 in David Hesmondhalgh and Jason Toynbee (eds) 
The Media and Social Theory. Abington: Routledge.  
Held, David (2006) Models of Democracy – 3rd Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
Hesmondhalgh, David (2002) The Cultural Industries. London: Sage. 
Innis, Harold (1951) The Bias of Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
Lagarde, Christine (2014) ‘A New Multilateralism for the 21st Century’. The Richard Dimbleby 
Lecture. London, 3 February: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/020314.htm  
Lash, Scott (2007) ‘Power after Hegemony: Cultural Studies in Mutation’. Theory, Culture 
and Society 24(3): 55-78. 
Lippmann, Walter (1925) The Phantom Public. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 
Livingstone, Sonia (2013) ‘The participation paradigm in audience research’. Communication 
Review 16(1-2): 21-30. 
Lukes, Steven (2005) Power: A Radical View – 2nd Edition. London: Macmillan Press. 
Mann, M. (1986) The sources of social power: A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 
1760 (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
European Journal of Communication  
 25. 
Manning, Paul (2012) ‘Financial journalism, news sources and the banking crisis’. Journalism 
14(2): 173-89. 
Manselson, Peter (2008) Letters to the Editor: Blair taxed about the filthy rich. The 
Guardian, 12 January: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/jan/12/tonyblair.labour  
Marx, Karl (1909) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I. The Process of Capitalist 
Production. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr and Co. 
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1846 [1970]) The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart Ltd. 
McChesney, Robert W. (2004) The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 
21st Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
McCurdy, Partick (2012) ‘Social Movements, Protest and Mainstream Media’, Sociology 
Compass 6(3): 244-55. 
Miliband, Ralph (1969) The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System 
of Power. London: Quartet Books Ltd.  
Mouffe, Chantal (2013) Agonistics: Thinking The World Politically. London: Verso. 
Norris, Pippa (2011) Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Peters, John Durham (2001) Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Phelan, Sean (2007) ‘The Discourses of Neoliberal Hegemony: The Case of The Irish 
Republic’. Critical Discourse Studies 4(1): 29-48. 
Rand, Ayan (1964) The Virtue of Selfishness. New York, NY: New American Library. 
Rucht, Dieter (2013) ‘Protest Movements and their Media Usages’, pp. 249-68 in Bart 
Cammaerts, Alice Matoni and Patrick McCurdy (eds) Mediation and Protest 
Movements. Bristol: Intellect. 
Schmitt, Carl (1996 [1927]) The Concept of the Political. Chicago, IL: Chicago University 
Press. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942 [1973]) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York, NY: 
Harper and Brothers. 
Silverstone, Roger (2006) Media and Morality. Cambridge: Polity. 
Spivak, Gayatri C. (1988) ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg 
(eds) Marxism and the interpretation of Culture. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
pp. 271-313. 
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle and Mohammadi, Ali (1994) Small Media, Big Revolution: 
Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution. Mineapolis: University Of 
Minnesota Press. 
Street, John (2001) Mass media, politics and democracy. London: Palgrave. 
Thompson, John B. (1990) Ideology and Modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity. 
WEF (2014) Global Risks 2014 – 9th Edition. Geneva: World Economic Forum.  
Wilks-Heeks, Stuart, Blick, Andrew and Crone, Stephen (2012) ‘How Democratic is the UK? 
The 2012 Audit’. London: Democratic Audit. 
Žižek, Slavoj (2008) In Defense of Lost Causes. London and New York: Verso. 
